Standing Committee D

[Part II]

[Mr. Bill O'Brien in the Chair]

Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill

[Continuation from col 82]

Clause 6 - Former Inland Revenue matters

Andrew Mitchell: I beg to move amendment No. 9, in clause 6, page 4, line 28, leave out paragraph (b).

Bill O'Brien: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment No. 10, in clause 6, page 4, line 32, leave out subsection (4).
Amendment No. 134, in clause 9, page 5, line 39, leave out subsection (1) and insert— 
'(1) SOCA may determine its own strategic priorities.'. 
Amendment No. 135, in clause 9, page 5, line 40, leave out 'the Secretary of State' and insert 'SOCA'. 
Amendment No. 136, in clause 9, page 6, line 1, leave out 'SOCA' and insert 'the Secretary of State'. 
Amendment No. 137, in clause 9, page 6, line 4, leave out 'The Secretary of State' and insert 'SOCA'. 
Amendment No. 138, in clause 9, page 6, line 5, leave out 'he' and insert 'it'. 
Clause 9 stand part. 
Clause 10 stand part.

Andrew Mitchell: We now come the second of the three significant issues that the Opposition wish to raise. Two points that are already familiar to the Committee—namely, the power of the Home Secretary and operational independence—are the subject of this group of amendments, which touch on points that have already been raised. The amendments are designed to ensure that SOCA can get on with its important operational functions without the potentially unhelpful and hindering interference of the Home Secretary.
We submit that the Home Secretary will have excessive control over SOCA, a fact that I set out in our debates on the first group of amendments that we considered this morning. We are concerned about the potential politicisation of SOCA and the lack of operational freedom to which it will lead. As I said earlier, the Home Secretary should determine the overall positioning of SOCA, but the board should decide how such policies should be implemented. 
On the politicisation of SOCA and the power of the Home Secretary, the most pointless and defunct provisions are found in clause 22. It states: 
''The Director General of SOCA has the function of exercising general operational control in relation to the activities carried out in the exercise of SOCA's functions.''
That would be all well and good if it were not contradicted throughout the Bill by references to the power of the Secretary of State over SOCA and how  he can exercise that power. Under the Bill, the director general will not have control over the allocation of all SOCA's resources, the setting of its strategic targets or the equipment that SOCA will use. Clause 9 gives the Home Secretary the power directly to set the strategic priorities of SOCA; clause 10 gives him the power directly to set its performance targets; clause 18 gives him the power to ring-fence sections of SOCA's grant; and clause 27 gives him the power to decide what technology and equipment SOCA can use. 
Clauses 9 and 10 deal with the strategic priorities and the performance targets, and we seek to amend the provisions to ensure that SOCA has a more clearly defined role in setting its own strategic priorities. We seek to ensure that SOCA retains its independence and non-political nature. Strategic independence is crucial to avoid the perception that strategy is determined by public opinion rather than by reference to developments in serious crime. In that sense, my fox has already been shot by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome and, to some extent by the hon. and learned Member for Redcar. For greater accuracy, I have obtained a copy of the much-mentioned article in The Independent, headlined ''UK's crime-fighting agency will use the press to set agenda''. It clearly makes the point that public opinion should not directly determine developments. It states: 
''Britain's new 'FBI' agency will be set priorities by the Home Office that are partly based on how much newspapers write about different types of organised crime.''
That is the very point about which we are concerned. We submit that it should be for the SOCA board to set strategy, and not the Home Secretary. 
We seek to remove the reference in clause 6 to the Home Secretary's strategic priorities when SOCA is compiling its annual plan. Again, it should be for SOCA, in conjunction with the Home Secretary, to set out clearly its priorities and strategic aims. We seek also to remove clause 10, under which the Secretary of State has the ability to set performance targets. Clauses 9 and 10 and associated clauses do not raise any point of true law, but they raise questions about the Government's policy and to what degree the Labour Government want law enforcement agencies to be the subject of political control. 
Operational independence is vital to SOCA's success. For example, it is vital that it has the flexibility to determine where and when to focus its activities. To combat serious organised crime in the United Kingdom, the focus and provision of SOCA support needs to be based on the consideration of need throughout the UK rather than any political agenda. It should be for the SOCA board and its chief officers to decide; the Secretary of State's influence should not be necessary. 
We have set out, particularly in earlier amendment, our view that the Home Secretary should not be able to influence the board as the Bill allows. Armed, by coincidence, with the article in Monday's edition of The Independent, we submit that the Committee would be wise to consider those important points and pass judgment on them.

David Heath: I support the general tenor of the remarks made by the hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield.
It must be extraordinarily irksome for a British Home Secretary at international conferences to be in the company of Ministers of the Interior who are in direct control of their security forces and gendarmeries and are able to say, ''I will commit my officers to such and such a task.'' The British Home Secretary would have to say, ''I do not control the police in my country. I have an influence on policing, but I do not control it.'' I believe that that has been the origin of many attempts over the years by successive Home Secretaries, who have fretted about the fact that they do not have control, to establish direct control—by subterfuge, by statute or by bullying chief constables and police authorities. 
We have to be very wary of that in this House. We in this country have a fine tradition of policing by consent and by tripartite arrangements that ensure that no single authority directs our police. That becomes doubly important when we establish a national agency of this kind, with far-reaching powers and a higher level of capability than many regional police forces. My concern is exactly what has been expressed: the Bill would provide for the Home Secretary to have very substantial operational control of the priorities, the programmes and the procurement of the agency being set up. 
The hon. and learned Member for Redcar suggested that I was trying to mislead the Committee earlier when I read out the quotes from Sir Stephen Lander—far from it. Reading out every single word of the interview would only have reinforced my point. Many of us have significant concerns about the way in which it appears that SOCA is to do its business, subjected to pressures that are largely populist rather than based on a candid assessment of policing need and the need to reduce serious and organised crime. We should be wary about giving too many levers of control to any Home Secretary—this one, his predecessor or Home Secretaries in the future. 
A level of independence in priority setting for SOCA is to be welcomed and encouraged and should be expressly set out in the legislation.

Jonathan Djanogly: I rise to speak in support of amendments Nos. 134 to 138. I shall not go over the discussion of the article in question; the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome, the hon. and learned Member for Redcar, the Minister and my hon. Friend the Member for Sutton Coldfield have covered that in some detail. Whatever the article does or does not say, we are right to be concerned that the strategy of SOCA should not become an instrument of the governing party's whim, egged on by public sentiment. Whether such a suggestion is in the article or not, that is a fair point.
Amendment No. 134 would give SOCA the ability to determine its own strategy. Of course, the Secretary of State would still have to be consulted, and amendment No. 135 makes that very point. The Minister may pooh-pooh the idea, but there could be some kind of halfway house. Why should not SOCA  or the Secretary of State have the right to determine strategy through consultation with the other party? Even more radically, why should not the parties determine strategy together? There are various alternatives that could form a more elegant solution than the yes-or-no approach that I have heard about so far in this debate. The Government have consistently shown their willingness to govern by market-testing and focus groups, and so I do not think that my point is invalid. 
I find clause 10 rather strange. I wholly support the idea of both individual and team performance targets; the latter are not relevant to the Bill, but could be relevant to management. I am not exactly sure why SOCA will be subject to performance targets itself. Is not this a means of possible ministerial control, which could be disproportionate? Could not the Minister threaten sanctions to create an atmosphere in which SOCA behaves in a certain way? A Minister might threaten SOCA and say, ''If you don't do such and such, we'll wind you up,'' but should not that be a matter for Parliament rather than a Minister? For all those reasons, I would be grateful if the Minister addressed the purpose behind performance targets in clause 10.

Caroline Flint: We have had an interesting debate. The amendments relate predominantly to clause 9, which enables the Home Secretary to set the strategic priorities for SOCA. The hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield seeks to remove the Home Secretary from the equation and leave it to the agency to set its own priorities: that is the situation in a nutshell. I remind the hon. Gentleman that clause 9 closely follows the precedent set by the Police Act 1997, passed by the previous Administration. Parts I and II of that Act enable the Home Secretary to set objectives for both the National Criminal Intelligence Service and the National Crime Squad.
The Bill uses the language of priorities, but in substance clause 9 is little different to what has gone before. I do not think that the sky has fallen down since then, or that it will in future. The Police Reform Act 2002 provides for the setting of strategic policing priorities by the Home Secretary in the context of the annual national policing plan. 
The Home Secretary has a legitimate role to play in setting the national context in which the various law enforcement agencies are to operate. I refer to the article in The Independent, as Sir Stephen Lander has been mentioned again. He was asked whether it is right for politicians to have an influence on how crime is tackled, and why we could not leave the matter to the professionals. He said: 
''You can't disentangle the political imperatives. If ministers want to have something slightly more important than something else then that is their political judgement.
They run the country, I don't—it's their judgement that counts.''
That is pretty clear. However, he went on to stress that, within SOCA and the framework of the Bill, the operational decisions on specific targets and cases would be made by SOCA. That is important, because at the end of the day, in many respects, the Home Secretary and the Government will be held to account for the activities of SOCA and its role in fighting  organised crime. Let us face it, it is the Home Secretary who is accountable to Parliament for the Government's record on fighting crime in this and other areas. 
It has already been said today that responsibility without power is as indefensible in a democratic society as power without responsibility. The Home Secretary can be held to account only if he has some means of influencing how SOCA discharges its functions. The amendments would deny any meaningful role for the Home Secretary in setting the priorities for SOCA. By their nature, any strategic priorities would be high level—for example focusing SOCA's energies on defeating the drug barons and those engaged in people smuggling. It will be open to SOCA to set its own additional priorities, subject to the proviso that they must be consistent with the strategic priorities. Furthermore, it will be down to SOCA to determine how to give effect to the Home Secretary's strategic priorities. We are not seeking to run SOCA from the Home Office. 
Part 1, taken as a whole, draws a proper and equitable balance between the respective roles of the Home Secretary, the SOCA board and the director general. It is important that we consider the totality of the checks and balances in relation to the roles of the Home Secretary and the agency. The amendments would destroy the balance between those three pillars which underpin the agency's governance.

Tony McWalter: Does my hon. Friend agree that in the amendments the model of what it is to be a Member of Parliament and what it is to have a Government is extraordinarily strange, because under them a Member of Parliament is there to respond to the perceptions of what is wrong in his or her constituency, including manifestations of serious and organised crime, which they take to Ministers and expect them to act on? That model means that MPs get shafted and are unable to do their jobs.

Caroline Flint: I agree with my hon. Friend. It is dangerous for any political party to suggest that we should disentangle the decisions that affect our constituents from the political process. Earlier today, we discussed the amount of money that the taxpayer will be paying towards running SOCA. There is another linkage in what my hon. Friend said in terms of accountability, which is important. However, there is more. I visited some officers from the National Crime Squad and asked how they dealt with and considered crime. Some of them said, ''How things have changed.'' They said that they used to spend years going after a criminal because they wanted to get him under a particular offence, but the nature of that offence and the network meant that they spent a lot of time, energy and resources going after what sometimes proved to be unattainable. They said, ''Today we have to be smarter and wiser. We need to disrupt these people and take them out of our communities and in doing so address some of the corrosive harm that they cause.''
Part of that debate is about our political influence in bringing to bear the experiences of our constituents  and the effect of crime on their lives, whether it is organised crime or antisocial behaviour. The amendments are dangerous and in many respects they add to cynicism about the political engagement that is so important and that we support and defend.

Andrew Mitchell: These started out as probing amendments, but the passion they have stirred on the other side of the Room has made me more certain that they are right. I am sorry to say that to the Minister after our debate on the last group of amendments, in which she so charmingly managed to satisfy our concerns.
At the heart of the matter is the question of whether the Home Secretary should be able both to settle all the priorities and nobble the board. That is too much of an armlock. The concept of the tripartite approach has been mentioned. It is important to remember that policing by consent in the UK is rooted in political independence. Systems and structures are needed to deliver that independence and they are delivered to local police forces by a statutory tripartite arrangement distributing power equally between the chief officer, the police authority and the Home Secretary. There is no reason why such a structure should not be applied nationally for SOCA in respect of the director general, the service authority and the Home Secretary. Arguably, there has been a shift of power within the tripartite structure. With more direction coming from the centre—from the Home Office—chief officers are held responsible for matters over which they have no control. There is a danger in politicising operational policing. Our belief that the tripartite structure is imbalanced in no way detracts from the fact that it is the most appropriate structure for policing. Police officers must act impartially, and they are accountable for their action or inaction. The tripartite structure has ultimate strength only if there is a balance of power and accountability. Unamended, the Bill would vest great power in a single individual, the Home Secretary. It is indisputable that there would be a danger of politicising the service if a politician alone were to hold those powers. For that reason, I shall divide the Committee on amendment No. 9. 
Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 6, Noes 10.

Question accordingly negatived. 
Clause 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7 - Annual reports

Andrew Mitchell: I beg to move amendment No. 13, in clause 7, page 5, line 28, at end insert
'(4A) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the annual report before Parliament.'.

Bill O'Brien: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 87, in clause 12, page 7, line 18, at end insert
'(4A) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament any report published under this section.'.

Andrew Mitchell: My amendment is very similar to that tabled by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome who is fast, on this Bill, becoming my hon. Friend. We both seek to ensure that SOCA is accountable to Parliament, not purely to the Home Secretary. It should be accountable both to the legislature and to the Executive. There is no doubt that it is accountable to the Executive, for many of the reasons that I have set out. It is less clear that it is properly accountable to the legislature. In view of the point made, with some passion, by the hon. Member for Hemel Hempstead during our debate on the last set of amendments, I feel doubly sure that he is with me and will support the amendment proposed jointly by the Liberal Democrats and Her Majesty's principal Opposition.
It is good discipline for the House to have an opportunity to debate such reports regularly. I underline that fact because I well know that Whips of all parties will not approve of the amendment to the same degree as will other hon. Members. I hope that it will command the support of the Committee, as it will enable hon. Members of all persuasions to comment on the performance of SOCA, in the way that the hon. Member for Hemel Hempstead outlined. After all, crime is of great concern across the House. It will give us a chance to examine the priorities of SOCA and to ensure that joined-up policing is taking place, and will enable us to establish how well SOCA is doing against the criteria set for it. It will also promote accountability—a concept that is immensely important in the view of Opposition Members.

David Heath: I shall speak to amendment No. 87, which has a superficial similarity to that of the hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield, although it refers to a different clause. My amendment deals with clause 12, rather than clause 7. The hon. Gentleman and I are in agreement this afternoon about significant aspects of the Bill—the difference being that I recollect the measures put before the House by the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard) when he was Home Secretary, and therefore have occasional reason for a wry smile.
I commend the methodology of putting reports before the House. It is important that there should be an opportunity to debate them. Amendment No. 13 would provide for the annual report to be placed before the House. The arguments put forward by the hon. Gentleman are doubled in the case of my amendment, because it deals with exceptional reports about something that has gone wrong with the operation of SOCA. It is right for Parliament to have an opportunity to discuss such a matter and  make appropriate recommendations to the Secretary of State about putting right whatever has been going wrong. 
I hope that the Minister will not hesitate to accept both amendments. I am sure that she will want to demonstrate beyond peradventure her wish that the operation of the Home Department and SOCA should be accountable to the House of Commons.

Caroline Flint: We are happy to accept amendment No. 13, although we do not accept that it follows that an annual parliamentary debate on SOCA is needed. There are many opportunities to discuss activities concerned with organised crime, and if the Opposition want to use some of their allocated time to initiate such a debate, it is open to them to do so. I should add at this point that the Scottish Executive have agreed that there should be a parallel duty on Scottish Ministers to lay a copy of SOCA's annual report before the Scottish Parliament, and an appropriate amendment to that end will be tabled on Report.
I am not persuaded that there is a similar case for laying before Parliament reports submitted to the Home Secretary under clause 12. The clause provides for any reports to be published. I should expect them to appear on SOCA's website and they should be freely available to parliamentarians. 
I fully accept that the Home Secretary must be accountable to Parliament for the way in which he discharges his functions under the Bill, but I am not sure whether that accountability would be strengthened by requiring every report that SOCA ever produced to be laid before the House. I remind the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome that no such requirement is contained in the equivalent provisions of the Police Act 1997. I believe that the reports published under clause 12 will be open to scrutiny, but I do not believe that amendment No. 87 is necessary, and I invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw it.

David Heath: I am obviously pleased that the Minister has accepted the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield, but I am extremely disappointed that she has not accepted the parallel provision in my amendment to clause 12. She says that she does not see the need for every report produced by SOCA to be put before the House. Nor do I, because I think that there are ways of identifying what SOCA is producing. However, the amendment is not concerned with just any report, but a report required by the Secretary of State. It would be an exceptional report into a matter on which the Secretary of State required the board of SOCA or the director general to provide him with information.
Parliament is entitled to that information as well, to enable it to form an opinion about the stewardship of SOCA or, indeed, the stewardship of the Home Secretary of the day. For that reason, I hope that there may be an opportunity at the appropriate time to press the amendment to a vote.

Andrew Mitchell: I am delighted that the Minister has accepted the cogency of our arguments for amendment No. 13 and that it is not therefore necessary for us to put it to the vote. I did think that the Liberal  Democrats' argument in support of amendment No. 87 was extremely powerful and I can, therefore, tell the Committee that if the hon. Gentleman is able to put the amendment to the vote at the appropriate time Her Majesty's principal Opposition will of course support him.
Amendment agreed to. 
Clause 7, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 8 to 11, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 12 - Reports to Secretary of State

Amendment proposed: No. 87, in clause 12, page 7, line 18, at end insert— 
'The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament any report published under this section.'.—[Mr. Heath.] 
Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 6, Noes 10.

Question accordingly negatived. 
Clause 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
Clauses 13 to 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17 - Inspections

David Heath: I beg to move amendment No. 88, in clause 17, page 9, line 37, leave out 'jointly by HMIC and'.
The amendment deals with the arrangements for Scotland where there is an inspection of SOCA's activities conducted entirely in Scotland. The provisions of subsection (3) require that: 
''Any inspection under this section must be carried out jointly by HMIC and the Scottish inspectors . . . if it is carried out wholly in Scotland, or . . . in a case where it is carried out partly in Scotland, to the extent that it is carried out there.''
If this is to be a joint affair, I can see no justification for the inspectors in Scotland not to be wholly responsible for what takes place in Scotland. Indeed, it is an extraordinary extension of the powers of HIMC for England and Wales that it should have any responsibility for activities that take place wholly in Scotland. It is therefore much more appropriate that the reference to ''jointly by HMIC'' should be left out of the arrangement. It is quite clear that HMIC and the Scottish inspectors will co-operate to a very great extent in their inspection regimes for SOCA, and it is quite appropriate that both should be involved when an inspection covers both England and Scotland, but it  is entirely inappropriate that HMIC should expressly be involved in inspection arrangements for matters that take place entirely in Scotland under Scottish law with constables who are trained, as we are told, to Scottish legal requirements. I do not believe that HMIC has a locus in such matters, which is the basis on which I propose the amendment.

Caroline Flint: I hope that my comments will reassure the hon. Gentleman about why we consider joint arrangements practical and in the interests of inspection. SOCA will be a UK-wide body and we have sought to put in place UK-wide arrangements, wherever possible. As we have said before, criminals have no respect for internal borders, let alone international borders. It would be artificial and counter-productive to have separate inspection arrangements in England, Wales and Northern Ireland on the one hand and in Scotland on the other. However, I fully accept that, as they will have the appropriate knowledge of Scottish police forces and of the Scottish Drug Enforcement Agency. Scottish inspectors have a role to play relevant to an inspection of SOCA's activities in Scotland. The Bill therefore provides for joint inspections by Her Majesty's inspectorate of constabulary and its Scottish counterpart. That is a sensible and workable arrangement that we have agreed with the Scottish Executive.
We want to encourage close collaboration between the various criminal justice inspectorates rather than reinforce the existing division of responsibilities. As such, the amendment would be detrimental to the arrangements for monitoring the efficiency and effectiveness of SOCA, so I invite the hon. Gentleman withdraw it.

David Heath: Devolution obviously goes only so far. HMIC inspectors from London, England, will go out to make sure that the Scottish inspectors know what they are doing. I do not find that entirely satisfactory, and were I a Scottish MP, I would find it repugnant. However, the silence from those quarters suggests the Scottish members of the Committee have been whipped into line and are not willing to express an opinion on behalf of their constituents. In the circumstances, it seems appropriate that I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
Clause 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
Clauses 18 to 21 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 22 - Operational responsibility of

David Heath: I beg to move amendment No. 89, in clause 22, page 12, line 21, at end add—
'(3) Any duty or responsibility of SOCA specified in sections 2 to 21 shall be a duty or responsibility of the Director General.'. 
The amendment would identify the director general as having the duties and responsibilities conferred by the Bill on SOCA as a whole. When considering schedule 1 we mentioned the vagueness of the  definition of SOCA. At one point, it is interpreted as being the board of SOCA; at others, it comprises the whole force of SOCA officers. Various duties fall on SOCA as a corporate entity, so there is at least the capacity for confusion in operational terms. 
If there were a failure to engage in the responsibilities and duties that pertain to SOCA, it might be more difficult to identify where responsibility lies if there were not a person on whom such duties were placed. In a police force, it is often the chief constable who has personal responsibility for what happens within his or her force. In SOCA, that responsibility is by no means clear. That amorphous body, SOCA, has responsibilities and duties corporately, which may or may not fall on the members of the board or those who are identified in the Bill. I believe that would be is more appropriate for the director general separately to have the responsibilities that fall on the body as a corporate structure. That would resolve any potential ambiguities in the wording of the Bill. I look forward to the Minister's response.

Caroline Flint: I confess to being slightly perplexed by the amendment. No duties or responsibilities of SOCA are mentioned in clause 22(1) and (2). The clause sets out on the face of the Bill the operational independence of the director general.

David Heath: Amendment No. 89 clearly refers to
''Any duty or responsibility of SOCA specified in sections 2 to 21''.
That is a very large part of the Bill. It has nothing to do with the clause.

Caroline Flint: What shall be a duty is specified in preceding provisions. As for the operational independence of the director general, I have no disagreement with the hon. Gentleman's detailed point, but I think that clause 22 does set out that independence on the face of the Bill. The SOCA board will collectively determine the strategies to be pursued by the agency in discharging its functions and it will hold the director general and his executive team to account. However, it will be for the director general to decide which particular operations to mount and how they are to be conducted. The clause as it stands makes that point and needs no further embellishment. I invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

David Heath: I do not think that the Minister was best served by the briefing that she was given on this amendment. My proposal was perfectly explicit: it is nothing to do with the specific operational responsibility conferred by clause 22; it is designed to deal with clauses 2 to 21 and all of the duties and responsibilities—

John Heppell: It does not say that.

David Heath: The hon. Gentleman says from a sedentary position that that is not what the amendment says, so let me read it out to him:
''Any duty or responsibility of SOCA specified in sections 2 to 21 shall be a duty or responsibility of the Director General.''
I find it hard to be told that is not what it says.

Tony McWalter: We smell a rat because we think that the hon. Gentleman is trying to move  responsibilities from the Secretary of State to the director general.

David Heath: The hon. Gentleman can smell as many rodents as he chooses. I had rather hoped he would read the amendment that I placed before the Committee. It could not be more explicit. It states:
''Any duty or responsibility of SOCA''—
not of the Secretary of State, of SOCA— 
''specified in sections 2 to 21'',
which all now stand part of the Bill, because that is what the Committee has said, 
''shall be a duty or responsibility of the Director General.''
I do not see how there could be any confusion in what that means. 
Mr. Heppell indicated assent.

David Heath: The Government Whip is now nodding sagely—the penny has dropped that this is in fact a perfectly sensible amendment. Unfortunately, the briefing the Minister received in response to it is based on an entirely erroneous interpretation. This means that we have not yet had the debate which we might have had.

Andrew Mitchell: I had not intended to intervene in this debate, but having listened carefully to the hon. Gentleman's argument, it seems to me that we have not yet had a proper response from the Government explaining why the amendment is not an improvement to the Bill that we can support. Unless the Minister tells us why the amendment is not helpful, it is our duty to support the hon. Gentleman by voting for it.

David Heath: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that expression of encouragement, but I genuinely hoped to hear the Minister explain that it was unnecessary to place the responsibility on the director general because it was conferred in some other way. However, it seems we are not to have that answer and however long I extend my remarks to give the Minister an opportunity to make another contribution—

Caroline Flint: I rise to the challenge, but my point still stands. We believe that the clause clearly outlines the operational responsibilities of the director general. That, taken with the other clauses relating to the role of the SOCA board, the annual plans and reports and the functions of SOCA, provide a clear understanding of SOCA's role and the director general's place in it. We do not need to embellish further.

David Heath: I am grateful to the Minister for intervening. That is not exactly the story that we heard the first time around, but it will suffice as a reply to my amendment. I will examine the matter again, taking account of the debates earlier today. I ask simply that she, too, examines it again.
In police forces, the chief constable's personal responsibilities—not those of the body corporate, the police force, or even of the police authority—are very clear. There is a case for the director general having a personal responsibility for the duties that fall upon SOCA as conferred by sections 2 to 21. That is not because there is any deficiency in accountability but because it is important that the director general of an  organisation set up in this form understands that the buck stops with them and that they have a responsibility for ensuring that the organisation works. That cannot be a matter for the board in some indeterminate way; nor can it be hived off to the Home Secretary or to junior officers within the organisation. The director general should have a responsibility to this country for ensuring that everything that is contained in the statute happens. That is an entirely sensible provision. I shall now sit down so that the Minister can respond.

Caroline Flint: I wish to make one more detailed point, because this is an important subject. In relation to previous clauses, we had a considerable discussion about the SOCA board and its formation. The duties and responsibilities of SOCA under clauses 2 to 21 properly rest with the SOCA board unless delegated by the board to the director general. We should keep it in mind that the director general is a member of the board and therefore shares its roles and responsibilities. I hope that explains a little further how the organisation will work in relation to the director general.

David Heath: That goes a little further, but I do not think that it is entirely satisfactory for a board to have responsibilities that an individual must eventually shoulder. That is the difference between SOCA and police forces; SOCA has a different structure. In matters of liberty and well-being I should prefer personal responsibility to lie with an individual rather than a board, however well intentioned and competent it may be. We know how in the corporate world it is difficult to pin responsibility on a board of directors as opposed to an individual. It is even more important in a law enforcement agency that one person has responsibility for the operation of the organisation under his or her control.
I do not intend to press the amendment to a Division, but I will consider more carefully what the Minister has said. Now that we have finally got everyone to understand what the amendment is about, that I am trying to improve the Bill, not to make it worse, and that this is a significant area for consideration, perhaps it is a matter that we can profitably return to on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
Clause 22 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 23 - Activities in Scotland in relation to crime

Andrew Mitchell: I beg to move amendment No. 68, in clause 23, page 12, line 31, at end add—
'(4) Subsections (1) to (3) shall not apply in the event of circumstances which the Secretary of State believes constitute a national emergency.'. 
The clause is particularly interesting, and will attract the attention of all the Committee, especially the hon. Member for Greenock and Inverclyde, who  contributed earlier today. The amendment is really very simple. 
In her first remarks, at the beginning of the day, the Minister made it clear that it is essential that SOCA be able move urgently and quickly if necessity dictates. The amendment would ensure that, in times of crisis, SOCA can act without the time delay imposed by seeking permission to work in Scotland. That would ensure that SOCA could work effectively as a national body. I call this the ''hot pursuit'' amendment, as it will enable SOCA to take action across the border without going through the bureaucratic delay of having to consult the Scottish authorities. Currently, SOCA does not have the ability to investigate serious organised crime in Scotland without obtaining permission. We are concerned that that will slow down investigation and lead to inefficiencies. It also seems excessive, as clause 5 states that SOCA must co-ordinate its information with the Scottish DEA and the Bill also requires SOCA to consult Scottish Ministers regarding its annual plan. 
The creation of SOCA is a significant opportunity to develop more effective international relationships and gateways to decrease the bureaucracy involved in negotiating with international forces. However, those noble sentiments are seriously undermined by the clause, which specifies that SOCA should get permission to operate in Scotland. We seek to remove it from the Bill, or at least to add the failsafe that the Secretary of State has the right to intervene in a national emergency. 
Should SOCA have to negotiate with a part of the United Kingdom before it can pursue an investigation? It is understandable that clearance would be required when working over international borders, but SOCA should be able to work in Scotland without having to jump through bureaucratic hoops. To those who have studied the difficulty in defeating terrorism in Ireland because of the arrangements on the border between southern Ireland and Northern Ireland, that an easy point to assert. If SOCA is liaising adequately with the Scottish DEA, as it should do under clause 5, it should not be necessary for the Lord Advocate in Scotland to scrutinise SOCA's motives. If SOCA officers need to be versed in Scots law, that should be part of their training. 
The Scotland Act 1998 created not a separate nation with an international border but a Scottish Parliament with the power to enact legislation and deal with taxation. SOCA should not have to divert time and resources into the bureaucracy-creating measure before us.

Russell Brown: The hon. Gentleman is right. What we have in Scotland is devolution. He referred earlier to Ireland; southern Ireland and Northern Ireland are two different countries, but Scotland is still part of the UK. We are talking about devolution, not independence.

Andrew Mitchell: I hope that that logic will lead the hon. Gentleman to support my amendment. He is entirely right about the difference in the nature of the borders, and I hope that he will agree that the problem that I set out—that of not being able to pursue  criminal activity, which does not recognise borders—is very real. The Minister herself said that it is important that the system is easy to understand and helps us to pursue serious criminals. That is at the heart of my amendment. Will the serious organised criminals being investigated and pursued by SOCA officers recognise that the clause represents a loophole in the law, which they can exploit to gain time while SOCA officers enter into negotiations with the Scottish authorities to gain clearance to cross the border?

David Cairns: That passage of the hon. Gentleman's speech is extraordinary. He is talking about criminals seeing the provisions as a loophole. Presumably they would also have to envisage the loophole being operable in a national emergency, because the clause applies only in a national emergency, so to take advantage of it, the clever criminals will have to work out the loophole and that there will be a national emergency at the time that they are going to commit their crime. Is not that a bit ridiculous?

Andrew Mitchell: That emphasises my point. The Home Secretary will be able to determine whether it is appropriate for pursuit to take place. The loophole is very real, for the reasons mentioned by the hon. Gentleman. A clever criminal will realise that if he or she goes across the Scotland-England border, there is a bar to SOCA. I hope that that will add to his enthusiasm for my amendment.

David Cairns: But the bar is only lifted in the event of a national emergency. If the amendment said that the Secretary of State shall have discretion under whatever circumstances and whatever power under any other Act to waive the bar, that would be fine, but the hon. Gentleman is tying it into a national emergency, so the clever criminals have to work out that they have to commit their criminal activity and make their way across the border to Scotland while there is a national emergency. Is not that a bit narrow?

Andrew Mitchell: I shall seriously consider tabling a further amendment on Report to satisfy the hon. Gentleman. He is suggesting a lower bar for the amendment and saying that my bar is too high and should be lower. Perhaps on Report we can try to enlist his support by tabling an amendment that strikes out ''national emergency'' and inserts ''in any case where hot pursuit would be helpful in pursuing a particular incident.''
SOCA should have in its statutory remit the independence to operate as necessary within the United Kingdom. Communications and discussions with the SDEA should be part of SOCA's everyday working to ensure that intelligence and information is used efficiently by all forces. SOCA should not need to seek permission every time it needs to carry out operations across the border.

David Cairns: I cannot support the hon. Gentleman's amendment. I understand his desire to amend subsections (1) and (2), but for the life of me I cannot understand why the amendment applies to subsection (3), which clearly says that the report should be made as soon as is practicable. I would have thought that a national emergency taking place that  would impinge on whether that was practical, so subsection (3) does not need to be amended.
Taking the amendment at face value and the fact that the hon. Gentleman is envisaging circumstances of national emergency, I have to say that having participated in the pre-legislative scrutiny of the Civil Contingencies Bill, I know that there are a lot of complex, detailed arrangements that have been worked out with the Scottish Executive and Whitehall about how, in a national emergency, all sorts of things will take place, not just in the criminal arena. However, the hon. Gentleman casually tables an amendment that would drive a coach and horses through all that. 
If we accept the latter part of his argument, in which he accepted that he has painted himself into a ridiculously small corner by using the words ''in a national emergency'', and consider the lower bar to which he refers, perhaps when riders had to be dispatched to the Scottish courts, changing horses every hundred miles or so—

Vera Baird: We have telephones now.

David Cairns: Precisely. If things were what they used to be, the hon. Gentleman might have a point. However, the Lord Advocate is an extraordinarily intelligent human being who knows how to work a phone and, I am reliably informed, e-mail too. If there were some question of hot pursuit, how quickly would the people have to move to be quicker than a phone call or e-mail?
The amendment is another attempt by the Conservatives, who have never accepted devolution, who opposed the creation of the Scottish Parliament, who campaigned for a no vote and seek at every turn to diminish the powers that the Scottish people voted for in a referendum, after which this Parliament handed over in the Scotland Act 1998—[Interruption.]

Bill O'Brien: Order. The hon. Gentleman must draw his comments to a close, because we will not have a debate on Scottish devolution.

Caroline Flint: Thank you, Mr. O'Brien, although I was enjoying my hon. Friend's contribution.
The amendment misses the point of the clause. The clause does not create a new obligation, but simply asserts that SOCA will operate within the existing Scottish criminal justice system. It is important for successful prosecutions that SOCA operates effectively within that system, while providing operations in Scotland. In a national emergency, the Scottish criminal justice system would still apply in Scotland. During the discussion of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, detailed examination was given to how we would respond to an emergency, whether it happened in England, Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland. The amendments would not take us forward. 
The hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield seems very concerned about how operations might be affected by what we believe is the right and proper engagement with the appropriate figures in Scotland. He raised the issue of hot pursuit, but mutually agreed arrangements are already in place through which Scottish and English forces can collaborate to detain someone  suspected of committing an offence. Such arrangements apply to the National Crime Squad and the SDEA as well as to territorial forces. Also already in place are agreed arrangements between the Crown Prosecution Service in England and Wales and the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service in Scotland on the prosecution of suspects. The Bill proposes nothing new. The arrangements already in place will extend to cover SOCA. I hope that that allays the hon. Gentleman's fears that SOCA would not be able to deal with crime in a meaningful and quick way.

Andrew Mitchell: The amendment did not start out as a probing amendment, although I think that it has become one. The Committee will understand that its aim is to ensure that there are no bureaucratic or artificial delays to the ability of SOCA to perform its duties beyond the border between England and Scotland. I am considerably relieved by the Minister's remarks and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
Clause 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 24 - Mutual assistance between SOCA

Amendment made: No. 14, in clause 24, page 13, line 43, at end insert— 
(9A) If the assistance mentioned in subsection (8) or (9) is provided for or (as the case may be) by— 
(a) a police force in Scotland, 
(b) the Scottish Drug Enforcement Agency, or 
(c) the Scottish Administration, the Secretary of State must, before making a determination under the subsection in question, consult the Scottish Ministers.'.—[Caroline Flint] 
Clause 24, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 25 - Mutual assistance between SOCA

Amendments made: No. 15, in clause 25, page 14, line 30, leave out 'the United Kingdom' and insert 
'England and Wales or Northern Ireland'. 
No. 16, in clause 25, page 14, line 31, after 'force', insert 
'other than the Scottish Drug Enforcement Agency'. 
No. 17, in clause 25, page 14, line 32, at end insert 
'other than the Scottish Administration'. 
No. 18, in clause 25, page 15, leave out lines 1 to 3.—[Caroline Flint] 
Clause 25, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
Clause 26 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 27 - Regulations as to equipment

Andrew Mitchell: I beg to move amendment No. 72, in clause 27, page 16, line 25, leave out from 'must' to 'such' in line 27 and insert—
'(a) consult SOCA and have regard to any representations it may make to him, and 
(b) consult'.

Bill O'Brien: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 164, in clause 148, page 113, line 18, at end insert—
'(za) any regulations under section 27;'.

Andrew Mitchell: The amendment represents the fifth of the six small points that we want to raise today. It is a probing amendment, designed to limit the Home Secretary's control over SOCA's functions and the way in which it chooses to allocate its budget for equipment. Clause 27 is a further example of the constraints placed on SOCA by the Bill and the Secretary of State's operational control of SOCA. It also represents a significant augmentation of the Secretary of State's powers.
The amendment is consistent with a theme voiced by Opposition Members today. We wish to amend the clause to ensure not only that SOCA will be consulted by the Secretary of State, but that the Secretary of State will have regard to that consultation. We believe that decisions made under the clause should, in certain circumstances, also be subject to the scrutiny of Parliament. 
The clause would allow the Secretary of State to make regulations governing the equipment used by SOCA. Regulations prescribing the design and performance of equipment provided or used for the purposes of SOCA could also be made. The current position is outlined in sections 6 and 7 of the Police Reform Act 2002, which give the Secretary of State regulation-making powers in respect of equipment for police use. That is extended to the NCS and NCIS. It allows the Secretary of State to require all police forces in England and Wales to use or keep available for use only equipment that is specified and to apply conditions to the use of equipment. The Secretary of State can also prohibit forces from using specified equipment. 
However, the key difference between those provisions and clause 27 is that the 2002 Act required the Secretary of State to consult ACPO and the APA before making any regulations. Section 6 of that Act adds the further caveat that the Secretary of State shall not make any regulations under subsection (1)(a) unless he considers it necessary to do so for the purpose of promoting the general efficiency and effectiveness of the police forces maintained for police areas in England and Wales. That section can also be regulated by Parliament, as section 6(2B) of the 2002 Act states: 
''A statutory instrument containing any regulations under this section shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.''
This probing amendment seeks to include a similar provision by amending clause 27 to ensure that the director general of SOCA has operational independence to use the available resources in whatever way is necessary to ensure the operational effectiveness of SOCA. The implications of the clause are major, particularly given the lack of parliamentary debate allowed. There are no checks on the powers of the Secretary of State to issue regulations about equipment. The ramifications of that could fundamentally alter the relationship between the law enforcement agencies and the people whom they seek to protect. 
Let us imagine that the Secretary of State has had discussions with a number of organisations and individuals and has decided that, in the circumstances, it would be sensible for some or all SOCA officers to be armed. Using this clause, he could issue a regulation stating that SOCA officers must use a certain type of weapon in certain circumstances. As SOCA officers are dealing with serious organised crime, that could mean most of the time. As SOCA will be not a police force but an organisation similar in its structure to the civil service, SOCA officers will not necessarily have had the full training and experience to use such weapons safely. The issue is highlighted by the fact that the Bill allows the director general to delegate police powers to SOCA officers without SOCA officers having had any training. 
I do not want to engage in a debate about whether SOCA officers and police officers should be armed. It might well be that in certain circumstances they should be armed. The point is that any measure of that nature should be debated in Parliament; it should not be allowed in through the back door. 
In summary, this amendment seeks to probe the Minister as to why what has applied to other arrangements in similar circumstances does not apply to this Bill.

David Heath: I want to ask the Minister whether any consideration was given, beyond the assertion that SOCA is not a police force, to why the present regulations pertaining to police forces could not be extended to include SOCA. That seems to be the most appropriate way of dealing with the matter. There is no obvious reason why SOCA should have equipment that is different from that available to police forces in this country, given the range of crime that they are required to deal with. It would seem a much simpler arrangement.
Also, are there any circumstances in which the Minister would anticipate a SOCA officer, whether or not acting in the office of constable, being in uniform? If there are, what arrangements will be made for the provision of identification or otherwise, and all the matters that pertain to police officers and, I think, Customs officers in uniform in similar circumstances?

Caroline Flint: Under the clause, the Home Secretary ''can''—that does not mean that on every occasion he will—through regulation prescribe the design and performance of equipment, require SOCA to use specified equipment or equipment of a specified description, require SOCA to use equipment of a type  approved by him that may or may not be subject to certain specified conditions of use, and prohibit the use of specified equipment or equipment of a specified description. Those are powers for the Home Secretary to have and use as appropriate.
The Secretary of State has long-standing powers to make regulations about the equipment used by police forces, which were continued in the Police Act 1997, for the National Crime Squad. Although SOCA is not a police force, it will work closely with police forces. It will be engaged in operational activities that will be similar, if not identical, in some cases to some of the operational activities undertaken by the police. There is therefore a question of consistency in matters of equipment.

Tony McWalter: I agree that there will be similarities of the kind that my hon. Friend mentioned, but I urge her to think again. I am a member of the Science and Technology Committee and we have done a lot of work on terrorism: we know that there are many bespoke forms of equipment that are suitable for dangers that occur exceptionally, outside the normal range of police activities. I ask my hon. Friend to think quite constructively about that matter.

Caroline Flint: I hope to reassure my hon. Friend. The power in question is one of the reserve powers that I hope we shall not need to exercise.
Mr. Grieve indicated dissent.

Caroline Flint: No, this is a serious point. Decisions about what equipment to use can for the most part be left to SOCA to determine. However, there may be rare occasions when it would be essential for SOCA and other law enforcement agencies to share, for example, information technology or communication systems. Bichard demonstrated in his report the issues that arise in this context.

Dominic Grieve: The Minister is, of course, right. Similarity in this context—and, indeed, a marriage of two organisations using the same equipment—is desirable. However, does that not highlight the oddity of SOCA? A para-police organisation is being established, but the Secretary of State's envisaged directions require no consultation with the ACPO. I do not think the Minister can escape the oddity of the organisation that she is putting together.
In view of the fact that SOCA will be carrying out policing functions, surely ACPO should be consulted; otherwise only two inferences can be made. One is that the Secretary of State intends to direct without reference to anyone else, and the other is that he intends to make SOCA take different equipment. The hon. Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mr. McWalter) has just said that that would be ridiculous, but the lack of consultation of the police force in connection with this organisation causes me real concern. 
The example of weaponry was cited. Customs and Excise has never been armed. If it required armed support, it went to the police. However, the implication now is clearly that SOCA could be armed. Those are quite worrying developments, and the Minister has not satisfied me about the Government's approach.

Caroline Flint: If the hon. Gentleman will allow me a little more time, I hope to be able to do so. I shall give another example. There might be a need for common communications equipment with the security services.
The point about ACPO is not really appropriate. However, we understand and support the idea of the Home Secretary consulting SOCA, but the amendment would require him not only to consult SOCA before making any regulations, but to 
''have regard to any representations''
made by the agency. We think that that amendment is unnecessary. I believe it is implicit in the duty to consult that the Home Secretary must have regard to any representations that are made; why else would one consult? Representations cannot simply be ignored. They must be considered—but not necessarily accepted. There is on some occasions a duty for the Home Secretary to consider the overriding imperative which, in this context of equipment and the wider interest of the efficiency and effectiveness of the law-enforcement community, might be to insist on the use of compatible technology. That is a practical and logical way forward. 
Amendment No. 164 would provide that the regulations on equipment should be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. That would be entirely disproportionate and an inefficient use of parliamentary time. Moreover, the clause does have precedent in that it models similar provisions for the NCS and NCIS in the Police Act 1997.

David Heath: I can see that there will be occasions when it is appropriate for a direction on communality to be applied to deal with, for instance, IT and other communications systems. I am more interested, however, in areas in which there will be prohibition of particular equipment. There have been several areas in which new weaponry or restraining equipment has been brought on to the market which the police are not allowed to use until that equipment has been tested adequately. It would be entirely inappropriate if SOCA, for no distinct operational reasons, could use equipment similar to the equipment that might be provided to police forces but which they cannot use. That is why it is sensible for the same regulations to apply to SOCA and to police forces wherever possible.

Caroline Flint: I shall write to the hon. Gentleman with more detail, and I hope that the Committee will accept my contribution.

Andrew Mitchell: I will withdraw the amendment in my bid to be helpful, as ever, to the Minister, but I hope that she will have heard the concern expressed, not least by the hon. Member for Hemel Hempstead, about the clause. The sentiments behind the amendment are striking an important note and might be helpful to the Minister and her colleagues in the Home Office. Whenever I hear a Minister explain that although the powers are in the Bill, the Government do not expect to use them, or that they will probably not be necessary, I always think that Members of Parliament should be enormously careful in allowing such powers to stay in the Bill on that basis. 
I hope that almost every Member of the House would agree that Home Office Ministers pay lip service to the fact that the Home Secretary must have regard to an argument. It is very hard to believe that the former Home Secretary would feel fettered if he did not accept an argument. He would have pretty scant regard to it. 
I will withdraw the amendment, but I hope that the Minister will register the concern that has been expressed across the Committee and consider returning on Report with other language that might address that concern. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
Clause 27 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 28 - Liability of SOCA for acts of seconded staff

Amendments made: No. 19, in clause 28, page 16, line 32, leave out 'seconded persons' and insert 
'persons to whom this section applies'.—[Caroline Flint.] 
No. 20, in clause 28, page 16, line 33, leave out 'members of SOCA's staff' and insert 'such persons'. 
No. 21, in clause 28, page 16, line 35, leave out second 'his' and insert 'their'. 
No. 22, in clause 28, page 16, line 36, leave out 'seconded persons' and insert 
'persons to whom this section applies'. 
No. 23, in clause 28, page 16, line 39, leave out subsection (3) and insert— 
'(3) This section applies to— 
(a) any constable or other person who has been seconded to SOCA to serve as a member of its staff, and 
(b) any constable or other person who has been provided for the assistance of SOCA under section 24, 25 or [Directed arrangements: Scotland].'.—[Caroline Flint.] 
Clause 28, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 29 - Payment by SOCA of amounts in connection

Amendment made: No. 24, in clause 29, page 17, line 14, at end insert— 
'(c) any constable or other person who has been provided for the assistance of SOCA under section 24, 25 or [Directed arrangements: Scotland].'. 
'(c) any constable or other person who has been provided for the assistance of SOCA under section 24, 25 or [Directed arrangements: Scotland].'.—[Caroline Flint.] 
Clause 29, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 30 - Application of sections 28 and 29 to

Amendments made: No. 25, in clause 30, page 17, line 22, leave out 
'seconded person within the meaning of that section' 
and insert 
'person to whom that section applies'. 
No. 26, in clause 30, page 17, line 32, leave out 
'seconded person within the meaning of that section' 
and insert 
'person to whom that section applies'.—[Caroline Flint.] 
Clause 30, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
Clause 31 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 32 - Disclosure of information by SOCA

Amendment made: No. 27, in clause 32, page 18, line 39, at end insert 
'or 
(c) a disclosure in contravention of section [Restrictions on further disclosure](2).'. 
'or 
(c) a disclosure in contravention of section [Restrictions on further disclosure](2).'.—[Caroline Flint.] 
Clause 32, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
Clause 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 34 - Disclosure of police information to SOCA

David Heath: I beg to move amendment No. 90, in clause 34, page 19, line 17, at end insert—
'(1A) The chief officer of a special police force must keep SOCA informed of any information relating to crime that appears to him likely to be relevant to the exercise by SOCA of any of its functions.'. 
There is a curious omission in the Bill. The clause imposes a duty, which seems a perfectly sensible provision. It is a new duty for a police constable, but it is none the worse for that. It is odd, however, that the same thing does not apply to what is termed ''a special police force''. To remind the Committee, this part of the Bill defines the following as special police forces: the Ministry of Defence police, the British Transport police, the Civil Nuclear Constabulary and the Scottish Drug Enforcement Agency. 
I cannot for the life of me see why it should be right for the chief constable of Avon and Somerset to pass on information to SOCA while it should not be necessary for the chief constable of the British Transport police to do so if that seems relevant to SOCA's functions. I am sure that is just an omission, and I hope that my amendment is helpful in drawing attention to it.

Caroline Flint: I am happy to accept the amendment in principle. However, I cannot advise the Committee to accept it as drafted because one of the special police forces defined in clause 3—the Scottish Drug Enforcement Agency—is headed by a director rather than a chief officer. If the hon. Gentleman agrees to withdraw the amendment, I shall undertake to introduce an appropriately worded Government amendment on Report.

David Heath: I am most grateful to the Minister for that. I thought there was a definition somewhere saying that a chief officer is defined as a director, but I  shall have to search further for that accessory definition. It is nice to have a win, even at this late stage, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
Clause 34 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
Clause 35 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 36 - Directions

Amendment made: No. 28, in clause 36, page 19, line 30, after 'State', insert 
'or by the Scottish Ministers'.—[Caroline Flint.] 
Clause 36, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
Clause 37 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 38 - Designation of SOCA staff as persons

David Heath: I beg to move amendment No. 93, in clause 38, page 21, line 6, after 'it,' insert
'the areas in which such powers may be exercised,'. 
The amendment deals with the designation of a person as having the power of a constable, and it would distinguish between a person exercising that power in Scotland and someone doing so in the rest of the country. The Minister has already addressed the issue to a certain extent, and she has given some helpful assurances on the necessary training. She explicitly said that no one will exercise the power of constable in Scotland unless they have the appropriate training to understand what the responsibilities and duties of a constable in Scotland are, as opposed to what they are in England and Wales. 
The power to confer the powers of a constable in the clause can be limited, but the one area in which it cannot be explicitly limited is in relation to the geographical extent within which that power can be exercised. To meet some genuine concerns about the applicability of SOCA and its operations to Scotland, it might be sensible for the power of designation to include the ability to distinguish Scotland from England and Wales for the purposes of this clause and others. That is what the amendment would do.

Caroline Flint: I agree that the director general might wish to restrict the exercise of powers by a designated person to a part of the United Kingdom. Clauses 41 and 42 make separate provision for the exercise of police powers in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. As a result, a designation might need to limit the exercise of powers to, say, England and Wales, to Great Britain or to the United Kingdom.
That said, although I understand the valid point that the hon. Gentleman makes, we do not feel that the amendment is necessary to achieve the aim that he wants. Subsection (2) already provides that a designation 
''may be made subject to any limitations specified in the designation''.
Such limitations may relate to the powers exercisable by virtue of that designation, 
''the purposes for which they are exercisable or otherwise''.
We believe that ''or otherwise'' covers, among other things, any geographical limitations. I hope that, with that explanation, the hon. Gentleman accepts that the amendment, although well meaning, is unnecessary and will therefore withdraw it.

David Heath: I am grateful to the Minister for giving me the assurance I seek. However, I am not entirely convinced that ''or otherwise'' in the provision she mentioned would normally be construed in the way she described, so I hope she will satisfy herself that that is the case. Perhaps that is a matter on which Ministers in Scotland may have an opinion as well. However, the intention is clearly in accordance with what I want to achieve, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

David Heath: I beg to move amendment No. 94, in clause 38, page 21, line 20, leave out from beginning to end of line 22 and insert—
'he shall continue to hold that office until (unless he returns to service in the same office) he ceases to be so employed.'.

Bill O'Brien: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment No. 75, in clause 38, page 21, line 21, after 'revives', insert
', together with any associated terms and conditions of any contract of employment under which he was employed prior to his employment with SOCA which are associated with the revived office.'. 
Amendment No. 76, in clause 38, page 21, line 25, at end add— 
'(7) References in this Act to ''employee'' are to an individual who has entered into or works under (or where the employment has ceased, worked under) a contract of employment. 
(8) References in this Act to ''employment'' are to employment under a contract of employment.'. 
Clause 50 stand part. 
Schedule 2 be the Second schedule to the Bill. 
Amendment No. 102, in schedule 3, page 128, line 27, leave out 'may' and insert 'shall'. 
Amendment No. 103, in schedule 3, page 128, line 36, at end insert— 
'(5) The scheme shall provide that the terms and conditions of employment of a person on a relevant appointment under section 9 or 55, as to the manner and circumstances on which his appointment may be terminated, shall have effect as the terms and conditions of employment with SOCA, and that any refusal by that person to accept any amendment to any such terms shall not be grounds to dismiss that person lawfully. 
Amendment No. 104, in schedule 3, page 129, line 8, leave out 'may' and insert 'shall'. 
Amendment No. 105, in schedule 3, page 129, line 9, at end insert 
'which shall (subject to any necessary modifications) be the same terms and conditions by virtue of which the person holds a relevant appointment.'. 
Amendment No. 106, in schedule 3, page 129, line 37, at end insert 
'except an appointment of a police member under section 9 or section 55 of the Police Act 1997.'. 
Amendment No. 107, in schedule 3, page 130, line 42, at end insert— 
'11A The Secretary of State must consult persons representing the interests of persons who are police members of the National Crime Squad and National Criminal Intelligence Service before making a transfer scheme which contains any provision— 
(a) relating to the transfer of such a person to the employment of SOCA; or 
(b) providing for the secondment of such a person to have effect as a secondment to SOCA.'. 
New clause 6—Complaints and misconduct (No. 2)— 
'(1) The jurisdiction of the Independent Police Complaints Commission (''the IPCC'') in relation to SOCA shall be restricted to those members of the staff of SOCA who have the powers of a constable. 
(2) In relation to those persons, the powers of the IPCC shall be restricted to the deprivation of other persons of the powers of a constable. 
(3) Any other investigations relating to the conduct of a member of the staff of SOCA shall be undertaken solely by SOCA.'.

David Heath: We return to the vexed question of the office of constable, albeit from the opposite direction. We are dealing not with the appointment or designation of a person who is an employee of SOCA in the post of constable, but with what happens to a constable who joins SOCA. Does that person retain the office of constable when he is employed in SOCA?
I do not want to cover exactly the same ground that we covered earlier, because that would be pointless. The Minister explained why it is inherently better that all officers in SOCA should have a homogenous designation. My concern is to ensure that good police officers are not deterred from joining SOCA because they would thereby lose the office of constable that they believe they deserve. I would be much happier for those entering SOCA to retain the status of officer, irrespective of whether they operate in the normal understanding of the office of constable, until they leave the service or return to either the police force from whence they came or a different police force. 
That is the purpose of the amendment, which says that such a person would continue in the office that they held when they entered the service of SOCA for the period of that service. In other words, a constable—someone who has been trained as a constable, attested as a constable and sworn in as a constable, and who therefore is a constable—could not be told that they were no longer a constable simply because they were employed in a different capacity while working for SOCA. That would be in the interest of the service, despite the Minister's concerns about having multi-tier officers in SOCA. 
In the same way, someone employed as a doctor in an administrative post, even as a Member of Parliament, would not cease to be a doctor by virtue of the fact that they no longer exercised their function as a doctor, whether of medicine or of philosophy. So  it should be with a constable. Someone who attains the specific office of constable should be able to retain it even if they work in an organisation where the specific duties and responsibilities of a constable are not part of the day-to-day operation. 
That is the purpose of my amendment, which returns to an issue that we have already debated at length. That is why it is not appropriate to have an extensive debate on the subject now. However, I firmly believe that it is in the interest of SOCA to attract constables, at whatever rank, from the police service. Whatever the Minister may say about members of existing squads not being deterred at present from expressing an interest in SOCA, it is a fact, subjectively and anecdotally, that many serving officers are extremely concerned that when they enter SOCA they will no longer be constables, as they were when they applied to join.

Andrew Mitchell: This is the third and final substantive point on which we wish to test the Minister—namely, the terms and conditions of service, and complaints. The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome set out the position fairly and well, and also made the perfectly fair point that we have already trodden on some of this ground.
I draw the attention of the Committee to the amendments tabled by me and my hon. Friends. Amendment No. 75 would ensure that the terms and conditions of any employee who was formerly a police constable outside SOCA, and whose office of police constable was suspended as a result of his employment as a SOCA constable, were revived should he resume his office on leaving SOCA. The purpose of amendment No. 76 is to clarify the employment status of employees by cross-referencing with section 230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. If the Government propose that staff are to have the same rights, amendment No. 8 could also be added. 
Amendments Nos. 102 to 105 would mean that there was no scope for the employment terms and conditions of transfer to SOCA being any less favourable than is currently the case for the employee. Our purpose with amendment No. 106 is to protect the terms and conditions of those transferred to SOCA, as it is fundamental to the ability of the new agency to attract recruits and operate successfully to provide such protection. Finally, on amendment No. 107, we believe that the Bill should include express provision to require consultation on the terms of any transfer scheme in so far as it impacts on members of the Police Federation who may be transferred to SOCA. I remind the Committee that the Police Federation is not a trade union. 
These are the key issues. It is our contention that there is insufficient separation between the commercial arrangements between an employer and an employee, and the powers to be conferred and exercised under the Bill. There should be no scope for the employment terms and conditions of transfer to SOCA being any less favourable than is currently the case. There is no limit on the terms and conditions that are to apply on a transfer to SOCA. The terms and conditions to which the police member is subject after transfer of  their employment to SOCA could be very different from those that apply in their current position. 
As the Minister knows, police officers can be dismissed only under the discipline or efficiency regulations or on grounds of ill health. They cannot be dismissed on notice. As non-police officers, those individuals will be under threat from dismissal on notice and their independence—their ability to withstand pressure to act in a particular way—will be compromised, in contrast with officers holding the office of constable. We discussed that point at length this morning. 
The protection of the terms and conditions of those transferred into SOCA is fundamental to the ability of the agency to attract recruits and operate successfully. Police officers employed directly by the National Crime Squad are employed under terms and conditions that do not include any notice period for termination. The transfer scheme must not be used as a means of terminating the employment of a police officer; albeit that the Secretary of State may determine the amount payable as compensation, it may be inadequate in contrast to the loss suffered by the officer. 
The fact that SOCA officers will be investigated by the IPCC is a patent example of mixed thinking by the Government. On one hand, it is proposed that SOCA officers should not be police officers; on the other hand, they would be overseen by a body established exclusively to oversee police complaints—namely, the IPCC. 
I next pursue the question of complaints, and draw the Committee's attention to new clause 6. The purpose of the new clause is to ensure that the employment rights of SOCA employees, including those who are designated constables, are preserved. That includes rights to do with dismissal and disciplinary hearings under the Employment Act 2002 (Dispute Resolution) Regulations 2004, which are properly the responsibility of SOCA as the employer. The new clause maintains the distinction of the office of constable. 
Clause 50 covers complaints against SOCA staff and the ultimate oversight of SOCA by the IPCC, which, for the reasons stated, shows confused thinking. Under the terms of the Employment Act 2002, employers are required to set up their own disciplinary and grievance procedures to deal with disciplinary matters, internal grievances and dismissal. Accordingly, SOCA should set up its own internal procedures governing the conduct of its employees. SOCA alone should have the power to dismiss its employees. 
The IPCC should arguably have no jurisdiction in conduct matters concerning SOCA employees. For the IPCC to be involved suggests that the rank of a SOCA constable will still retain its privileges. The drafting could be tightened to require the Government to state precisely what the IPCC will have the power to investigate and what, if any, will be the limitations on its recommendations. If the Minister believes that  that would be a good way forward, perhaps she will say so. 
The Government may intend the IPCC to have the same role as the General Medical Council or the Law Society, as the professional body dealing with the question of the removal or otherwise of a SOCA constable's rank as constable, with SOCA being left to dismiss or otherwise discipline the employee. In any event, the new clause would clarify the powers of the IPCC. 
I hope that the Minister will be sensitive to the concerns that I and the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome have set out, and comment on the key issues that we have raised.

Caroline Flint: The amendments deal with a number of interlinked issues. I shall start with amendments Nos. 94, 75 and 76, and address the contribution of the hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield. I understand where he is coming from, although he is misguided in his approach. He is clearly trying to safeguard the interests of SOCA staff in the event that, after their time in SOCA, they wished to return to their original employment, whether with the local police force, the immigration service or HMRC. The Bill ensures that a person's office, whether as a constable or immigration or customs officer, is held in suspense and can be revived, so that it does not prove to be a hurdle with the prospective employer to whom the person wishes to return.
The hon. Gentleman's amendments propose that the terms and conditions under which a person was employed prior to joining SOCA that are associated with the office to which he wants to return revive at the same time as his office. Admittedly, that would ensure that the terms and conditions under which the person returned were no less favourable. Ironically, however, and contrary to the hon. Gentleman's intentions, setting such a requirement in statute would mean that such a person was not and could not be any better off. 
Working for SOCA can bring opportunities and new levels of activity for many, including detective constables. During their time with SOCA, they might be given responsibilities or opportunities such that they would return to force level with higher competencies. It is therefore important that we provide that all SOCA employees who take up opportunities to advance their skills and responsibilities are not disadvantaged, whether they are former police officers who want to return to the force or specialists who want to find employment elsewhere in the law enforcement community. It is far better for the original employer—be it a police force or otherwise—to which the person seeks to return and with which their office would be revived to be able to take into account the time spent with SOCA. I believe that that should be reflected in any terms and conditions accrued between them. We are confident that experiences in SOCA will mean that returns are made under more favourable terms and conditions. 
I hope that my explanation clarifies the Government's approach and reassures the hon.  Gentleman on why we do not want to tie an individual to the precise terms and conditions that applied when they left a police force or other organisation so that their experience with SOCA cannot be taken into account. 
The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome proposes in amendment No. 94 that rather than the suspension of a person's office on their joining SOCA, assuming that they had not resigned from the office before joining, they should continue to hold that office at the same time as being employed by SOCA. That is an unattractive proposition, and our view is partly based on what we discussed earlier today. SOCA will be more than the sum of its parts. If it is to establish its own culture and ways of working, it will need a clean break from the past, and we would not achieve that if the agency's staff continued to hold one or other of the offices of constable, customs officer or immigration officer. We have had a wide debate on the powers that are important for people to be able to do their job, but there is a difference between powers and a title assigned to someone. We have recognised that by providing for suspension of the title while the person works for SOCA. 
Amendments Nos. 77 and 78 and new clause 6 would give the Independent Police Complaints Commission sole responsibility for investigating a complaint about, or misconduct by, SOCA staff anywhere in the UK. At the same time, the IPCC's jurisdiction would be limited to those members who had and could exercise the powers of a constable. Complaints against other members of SOCA staff would be investigated by the agency itself, with no role for the IPCC. 
I believe that the amendments are intended to follow on from attempts that the hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield made earlier to change the nature of the Bill and to turn SOCA into a police organisation staffed mostly by police officers. Even if that is so, the amendments cannot stand, because under them the IPCC would be responsible for investigating SOCA staff anywhere in the UK. That would mean that the IPCC would cut across the role of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland. 
I suspect that the amendments are at least partly inspired by concerns about how SOCA fits in with the remit of the IPCC. The remit of the Independent Police Complaints Commission, as its name suggests, is to oversee the arrangements for the investigation of complaints against members of police forces—both police constables and police staff. We considered whether the IPCC was the appropriate body to oversee complaints against SOCA staff, given that SOCA will not be a police body. The point has been made by the hon. Gentleman. It would not be an efficient use of resources to set up a bespoke complaints body for SOCA. We must consider the effective and efficient use of public money. That is why we have sought instead to go down a different route and to broaden the remit of the IPCC, albeit without changing its name. The commission already has responsibility for oversight of complaints against community support officers and other designated  police staff, so it is a relatively small step to confer on it a role in respect of SOCA staff. 
In the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Bill, we are giving the IPCC responsibility for oversight of the investigation of complaints against Revenue and customs officers. The important point is that the IPCC has the staff, skills and experience to investigate independently the most serious complaints made against SOCA staff, and to ensure that SOCA's arrangements for investigating less serious complaints conform to best practice. 
Similarly, although it could be said that the ombudsman is currently solely responsible for investigating complaints against police officers in the Police Service of Northern Ireland, and so should not take on investigations for SOCA in Northern Ireland, that would be anachronistic, as the remit of the ombudsman is being changed elsewhere so that it extends beyond police officers to include civilian staff. That explains in more detail our thoughts behind the way in which we have defined the role of the IPCC; the landscape is changing in a number of areas, and the provision makes practical sense. 
Clause 50 and schedule 2 provide a practical means of ensuring independent oversight of the investigation of complaints made against all SOCA staff. The provisions are an essential element of the accountability framework that we are putting in place for SOCA, and they should stand part of the Bill. 
Through amendments Nos. 102 to 106, the hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield clearly wishes to protect the terms and conditions of those transferring into SOCA from its four precursors, so that those employees are not disadvantaged as a result of that transfer. I should reiterate right from the start what we have already made clear in debates in the House: the terms and conditions of any individual transferring from any of SOCA's precursors—be it the NCS, NCIS, the immigration service or Customs—to become an employee of SOCA will not be any less favourable than those of their appointment or service in those organisations. The hon. Gentleman's amendments would freeze all existing terms and conditions, particularly for the police members of the National Crime Squad and NCIS. Where the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 apply to transfers, we will naturally comply with those requirements. Where TUPE does not apply—for example, in the case of police officers—we will apply the principles of TUPE in accordance with the Cabinet Office statement of practice on staff transfers. 
The key point is that there will be no detriment to the terms and conditions as a whole of transferring staff. That does not mean that each and every term and condition will be unchanged. Police members of the NCS transferring to SOCA will be no longer police officers but employees of the agency. In those circumstances, it will not be appropriate for them to be on exactly the same terms and conditions as before, but they will not be disadvantaged by any changes. 
Some points were made on SOCA's disciplinary procedures, which would provide for dismissal—for  example, for gross misconduct—as do those of the police. SOCA staff will have the full employment rights that all other employees have, including rights against unfair dismissal. Therefore, SOCA staff will be in the same position as Customs and immigration officers, who are no less impartial in the exercise of their powers than police officers. 
Finally, I have some good news on amendment No. 107. I understand the concerns of the hon. Gentleman, and sympathise with him. The SOCA programme team is already in consultation with the Police Federation and the trade unions that represent other staff of the four precursor agencies who will transfer to SOCA. I would be content to formalise in statute what we are already doing in practice. I cannot invite the Committee to accept amendment No. 107 in its current form, as any duty to consult should go wider than to persons representing the interests of the police members of the NCS and NCIS—namely, the Police Federation. If the hon. Gentleman will agree to withdraw his amendment, I will table an appropriate Government amendment on Report.

Andrew Mitchell: We are discussing both the terms and conditions of employment by SOCA and the nature of the complaints procedure. They need to be kept separate. I think that I heard the Minister say—this is key—that she was satisfied that the terms and conditions were likely to be more rather than less attractive than those of the component parts. If I heard her say that—she is looking as though I did not, but if I did—

Caroline Flint: I said that there would not be any detriment to the terms and conditions of those transferring to SOCA. I was making the point that to freeze the terms and conditions of those arriving in SOCA from one of the precursor organisations so that they could return only on the terms and conditions that they left would disadvantage those who might gain experience in SOCA, which would be reflected if they returned to the other organisations.

Andrew Mitchell: The Minister has made her position clear and the record will reflect that. SOCA has to be able to recruit, motivate and retain those who are going to carry out the extremely important work that we expect of SOCA. I am happy not to press the amendments, because the Minister's position is clearly understood by the Committee to reflect a prime concern and it will be for the terms and conditions to meet that absolute requirement.
I have some sympathy with what the Minister says about complaints and we may want to return to that on Report. However, following the charming way in which she accepted the points behind amendment No. 107 it would be churlish of me to press the other amendments, so I shall not do so.

David Heath: We have had a useful debate. The hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield has indicated that he does not intend to press his amendments on the complaints procedure; I part company with him on that point, because it is important that we have a common complaints procedure for SOCA and the Independent Police Complaints Commission is  probably the most appropriate place. I have argued consistently during the past couple of years that we need to extend the provisions for the complaints procedure to Customs and Excise officers, who are outside the police complaints procedures but often exercise the same sort of powers as police. The same applies to the officers of the Immigration and Nationality Directorate when they are exercising quasi-police powers. There is a question about the adequacy of the resources that are available to the IPCC to that much larger role, and whether there might be detriment to the police service as a whole because its complaints procedure has effectively been hijacked by many other operatives in different spheres. That is a debate to which we will have to return another day.
What the Minister said about individuals' capacity to retain not only their pre-existing terms and conditions, but effectively enhance them during service with SOCA, is helpful and I am happy to hear it. However, there is so much that we still do not know about how SOCA will operate. Will it have a rank structure and, if so, what type? Will promotion within SOCA be recognised on return to a police force? The person concerned will no longer be in the office of constable and have no opportunity to sit a board. Will someone who has risen through the ranks at SOCA have to return to their police force in the rank they were in when they left, despite the fact that they have had considerably enhanced experience while working in SOCA? We need to debate those matters later. 
The Minister and I do not agree about the lead amendment, which deals with the office of constable. We do not agree that it is in the interests of SOCA that constables leaving the police service should retain that the office of constable while they are in SOCA. I am not going to persuade her and she is not going to persuade me. We have debated the matter already and divided the Committee. I do not see any great advantage in doing so again. We will undoubtedly return to this matter on Report and in another place. On that basis I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
Clause 38 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 39 - Delegation of power to designate

David Heath: I beg to move amendment No. 95, in clause 39, page 21, line 28, leave out from second 'to' to end of line 31 and insert 'his deputy'.

Bill O'Brien: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 96, in clause 40, page 21, line 36, leave out subsections (2) and (3).

David Heath: We now come to the delegation of the power to designate a person as a constable. The clause allows the director general of SOCA to delegate the power to make designations to any employee of SOCA, albeit qualified by the words ''At the prescribed level''—although we know not what that  might mean at the moment, because that is to be done by an order of the Secretary of State.
My simple solution to that uncertainty is to provide that the only people who are appropriate to make the designation and give the powers of constable, which are significant, be the director general of SOCA or his deputy. Further than that, the capacity to designate should not go. The matter is serious and we expect the director general to show due diligence and ensure that the person who is to be designated has had the proper training, is an appropriate person to carry out the responsibility and office of constable and understands the duties, powers, privileges and responsibilities that go with the post. 
My proposal is to specify precisely the individuals who have the appropriate capacity: they are the director general or his deputy. The other amendment, No. 96, would remove the references to the person to whom the power is delegated under the subsequent clause.

Caroline Flint: The amendment is not realistic. SOCA will have 4,500 staff and although not all of them will be designated powers, a sizeable number will be. It is impractical to expect designation to be made only by one or two people, which is why we cannot support the amendment. Given that the task is important, we believe that it should be discharged by someone of sufficient seniority, which is why we included in subsection (2) the power of the Home Secretary to specify the grade of the employee below which the task cannot be delegated. SOCA is still developing its grading structure and human resource function, so I cannot say now what grade we have in mind. However, I assure the hon. Gentleman that it will be high up the management line.
In addition, there is no provision in the Bill for a deputy director general. I mentioned earlier that the next management level down from the director general will consist of four director posts, so the amendments would be even more unworkable. I invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw them.

David Heath: I accept—because we only heard it today—that there will be no deputy director general, although I find that slightly odd in such an organisation. There will be the capacity for the organisation to lack leadership in the case of the illness of the director general. Indeed, when we went through the agonies of redesigning the senior management of police forces, it emerged that we could not have two or three assistant chief constables and not identify one of them as the deputy to the chief constable to act in the absence of the chief constable. We have gone through that process, so why on earth are we going through it again with the establishment of the new organisation? There may be several directors but, in effect, one of them will be designated the deputy.
I should be content if the Minister tabled an amendment saying that the director general or the directors would have such capacity. I agree that it is impractical for one person to designate all the constables within the service, but it is also impractical to allow the matter to be dealt with at  too low a level of responsibility. It is a significant and serious business and it is entirely impractical for the responsibility to lie with a single individual—the director general or someone acting in his absence. I am not persuaded by the Minister's argument. I intend to take the matter further when we have more information about the management structure of the body as a whole, which I hope that she will provide. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
Clause 39 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
Clause 40 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 41 - Person having powers of a constable

David Heath: I beg to move amendment No. 97, in clause 41, page 22, line 9, at end insert 'the'.
This is pedantry. It would allow consistent drafting, so I hope that the Minister will say that she agrees with it.

Caroline Flint: Yes, we accept the amendment, and we have spotted a few other such examples, so we will make some changes to those subsections later.
Amendment agreed to. 
Clause 41, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
Clauses 42 to 44 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 45 - Designations: supplementary

Amendment made: No. 29, in clause 45, page 24, line 34, leave out 
'seconded person (within the meaning of section 28)' 
and insert 
'person to whom section 28 applies by virtue of subsection (3)(a) of that section'.—[Caroline Flint.] 
Clause 45, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
Clause 46 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 47 - Modification of enactments

Amendment made: No. 30, in clause 47, page 26, line 4, at end insert— 
'(c) conferring on the Director General of SOCA functions exercisable in relation to such persons.'.—[Caroline Flint.] 
Clause 47, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 48 - Employment provisions

David Heath: I beg to move amendment No. 98, in clause 48, page 26, line 21, leave out 'not'.
The amendment would reverse the assumption inherent in clause 48, so that every person acting in the office of constable, whether they were in the police service or in SOCA, is treated the same. That seems an appropriate and admirable sentiment.

Andrew Mitchell: In view of the time, it may be convenient for the Committee if I merely make it clear that Her Majesty's official Opposition support the amendment.

Caroline Flint: We will have to resist the amendment. It would deny trade union membership and other employment rights which are currently unavailable to police constables, but which, as the Bill currently stands, are available to SOCA staff designated the powers of a constable under clause 38. We are firmly of the view that SOCA staff should not be police constables and should instead have powers of a constable designated to them by the director general.
The amendment naturally follows others that the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome has tabled against which we have strongly and convincingly argued. If the amendment is seen in isolation it would create a separate cadre of staff in SOCA, which would be split in two: on the one side would be members of staff with police powers who would, under the amendment, have the same status as constables in trade union and other employment law, and on the other side would be other staff of SOCA, perhaps with one or both of the powers of a customs or immigrations officer, but with entirely different sets of trade union employment rights. I hope that even the hon. Gentleman recognises that cleaving SOCA in two is hardly the best way to create a harmonised and integrated work force. Seconded police officers will still be subject to the bar on trade union membership, because obviously they are not full employees of the organisation. I hope that, in light of that explanation, the hon. Gentleman will withdraw his amendment.

David Heath: I bridled a bit at the ''even the hon. Gentleman'', but apart from that, I will consider what the Minister has to say, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
Clause 48 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
Clauses 49 and 50 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
Schedule 2 agreed to. 
Clauses 51 and 52 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
Schedule 3 agreed to. 
Clause 53 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
Schedule 4 agreed to.

New clause 1 - Liability of special police forces

'(1) The relevant authority is liable in respect of unlawful conduct of persons to whom this section applies in the carrying out, or the purported carrying out, of their functions as such persons in the same manner as an employer is liable in respect of any unlawful conduct of his employees in the course of their employment. 
(2) In the case of any such unlawful conduct of persons to whom this section applies which is a tort, the relevant authority is accordingly to be treated as a joint tortfeasor. 
This subsection does not apply to Scotland. 
(3) In so far as a relevant authority does not already have power to do so it may, in such cases and to such extent as appear to it to be appropriate, pay— 
(a) any damages or costs awarded against a person to whom this section applies in proceedings for any unlawful conduct of that person, 
(b) any costs (or, in Scotland, expenses) incurred and not recovered by such a person in such proceedings, and 
(c) any sum required in connection with the settlement of a claim that has, or might have, given rise to such proceedings. 
(4) This section applies to a member of the staff of SOCA who under section 24, 25 or [Directed arrangements: Scotland] is provided for the assistance of— 
(a) a special police force, or 
(b) a law enforcement agency operating in the United Kingdom. 
(5) In this section— 
''law enforcement agency'' has the meaning given by section 3(4) (subject to the territorial restriction contained in subsection (4)(b) above), and 
''relevant authority''— 
(a) in relation to a member of the staff of SOCA provided for the assistance of the Ministry of Defence Police, means the Secretary of State, 
(b) in relation to a member of the staff of SOCA provided for the assistance of the British Transport Police Force, means the British Transport Police Authority, 
(c) in relation to a member of the staff of SOCA provided for the assistance of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, means the Civil Nuclear Police Authority, 
(d) in relation to a member of the staff of SOCA provided for the assistance of the Scottish Drug Enforcement Agency, means that Agency, 
(e) in relation to a member of the staff of SOCA provided for the assistance of the Commissioners, means those Commissioners, 
(f) in relation to a member of the staff of SOCA provided for the assistance of the Scottish Administration, means the Scottish Ministers, and 
(g) in relation to a member of the staff of SOCA provided for the assistance of any other law enforcement agency, means such person as is prescribed in relation to that agency by regulations made by the Secretary of State.'.—[Caroline Flint.] 
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill. 
Further consideration adjourned.—[Mr. Heppell.] 
Adjourned accordingly at Seven o'clock till Thursday 13 January at ten minutes past Nine o'clock.